Using for the first time survey data from 26 post-Communist countries, covering the period 1990-2005, the paper examines correlates of unprecedented increases in inequality registered by most of these economies. We find that, after controlling for country-fixed effects and type of survey used, economic reform (measured by the EBRD index) is strongly negatively associated with bottom deciles' income shares and positively with income shares of the top two deciles. However, once economic reform is broken into its different component parts, the picture is more nuanced: large-scale privatization and infrastructure reform (mostly consisting of privatization and higher fees) are responsible for this pro-inequality effect while small-scale privatization tends to raise income shares of the bottom deciles. Acceleration in growth is also pro-rich. On the other hand, democratization (measured by the Polity measure) is strongly pro-poor, as is lower inflation. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no evidence that higher government spending as share of GDI reduces inequality.
Inequality in ECA: Literature Review
Inequality considerations are important to policymakers not only because they are linked to the economic state of affairs but also to social and political conditions of a given country. It is even more so in countries that underwent transition from a planned and state controlled to market economy in the era of globalization. However, there is limited number of rigorous empirical studies on the evolution of inequality in transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Although there is lack of consensus on the impact of inequality on economic growth, the limited empirical evidence that has recently become available for transition countries shows that the effect of inequality on growth can be negative and robust (e.g., Ferreira,1999; Ivanova, 2006; Sukiassyan, 2007) .
This paper provides a brief review of the literature on the determinants of inequality in transition countries, with particular emphasis on globalization and the evolution of institutions and government policies pursued with the new economic order following the transition. The paper then attempts to investigate the causes of and establish some stylized facts on the changes in inequality using a rich data based on household surveys collected over the last 16 years (1990-2005) .
The empirical studies on inequality in transition countries are relatively few in numbers despite the importance of the topic. There are only several studies that attempted to systematically and empirically investigate inequality in the transition countries and provide some possible explanations for its evolution since the beginning of transition (Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006; Ferreira, 1999; Milanovic, 1999; Ivaschenko, 2002; Giammatteo, 2006) . These studies on the distribution of income immediately, during and after the transition show that there has been appreciable increase in inequality in most Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries, albeit at varying degrees in magnitude and pace. A widespread view is that the transition to market economy, which entailed several transformations including: liberalization and integration of capital, goods and services, and labor markets into regional and world markets; the privatization of state owned enterprises; and the formation of new institutions to serve the market economy, has invariably led to a significant shift in the distribution of income. Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) provide a summary of the findings of many studies on the inequality trends in transition countries. After careful review of the existing literature, they conclude that all the countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union experienced an increase in inequality, but with considerable variations from one country setting to another. A rapid increase in inequality took place in the middle-income and low-income CIS countries, whereas the new member states of the European Union appear to have experienced a more gradual increase in inequality. For example, in Russia, Gini increased from only 25.9 in 1989-90 to 40.9 in 1994 , showing a very rapid increase immediately after dismantling of the old communist system. In contrast, in Poland, despite a similar level of inequality in 1989-90 (Gini of 25.5), the level of inequality increased to only 32 in 1995, according to comparable estimations by Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) using income data from official sources. Milanovic (1999) argues that the observed increase in inequality in transition countries is driven mainly by higher inequality in wage distribution following upon the dismantling of the state sector with compressed wage structure, and its replacement as the main employer by the newly-emerging private sector (with much broader wage distribution). He also finds the effects of social transfers to have varied widely, in some cases halting further increases in inequality (Poland), and in others (e.g., Russia during the early years of transition) having a perverse effects of contributing to inequality. Ivaschenko's (2002) looks at the determinants of changes in income inequality using a panel of inequality estimates for 24 Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries for the period 1989-1998. His is the first panel analysis of inequality during transition.
Ivaschenko's main conclusion is that increases in inequality are associated with privatization and "deindustrialization" (often the two facets of the same phenomenon).
He also find out that there was no significant impact of unemployment rate and the size of government spending on income distribution. Another interesting finding of the study was the contrast between for Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union country groups in the relationship between income inequality and per capita GDP. While the association between GDP per capita and changes in inequality was found to be positive in the Eastern Europe countries, the study finds significantly negative relationship between the two variables for the former Soviet Union countries.
Although the transition countries devised new social policies to contain the social costs of reforms and to alleviate the impact on the population of the drastic economic and social changes that ensued the transition period, studies show that the growth oriented policies that favored market liberalizations and privatizations have had adverse impact on income distribution. Holscher (2006) attempted to provide evidence on the validity of the widespread view that the change from socialism to capitalism led to rising inequality using data from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia. His findings reinforce the view that increase in inequality is moderate in countries of Eastern Europe in comparison to the dramatic surge in inequality observed in the former Soviet Union countries (e.g., Russia).
A study by Ivanova (2006) highlighted the effect of government policies on inequality in the context of the transition to market-based economy using evidence from Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. It shows that government policies prompted by the trend towards liberalization and privatization, such as reducing social spending, limiting access to social assistance through strong selectivity and conditionality criteria, and introducing market-regulated access to many social services, have had profound negative impact on socioeconomic equality and contributed to inequality's embedding in the transforming societies. According to this study, inequality was not only a byproduct of macroeconomic policies, but also a natural outcome of the particular model of society chosen by the transition economies, for instance, to the choice of the minimalist safetynet approach which provides social protection at a minimal fiscal cost for the most needy as opposed to the universalistic welfare-state approach of the European social market economy.
While inequality increased in the transition region overall, country specific studies provide a clearer trend of changes in inequality within a given country. A study of Poland's income distribution before and during the transition from socialism to a market economy (Keane and Prasad 2002 ) reveals significant increases in inequality as measured by wages from formal employment. Keane and Prasad also find that the reallocation of workers from a public sector with a compressed wage distribution to a private sector with much higher wage inequality, accounts for the bulk of increased earnings inequality during transition.
The unemployment benefits, pensions, family and child allowances that provided economic protection for the most vulnerable citizens prior to the transition had underwent transformations. Giammateo (2006) looked at the impact of the state transfers (and taxes) and market oriented reforms on gross (disposable) income inequality. Giammateo's study uses the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) data for Poland, Hungary and Russia, and concludes that these changes had led to an increase in inequality in these countries between 1990 and 2000. The study showed Russia had the most unequal market and disposable income distribution, followed by Hungary and then Poland. The paper concludes that the redistribution policies played a key role during the transition period, allowing authorities to contain inequality during the period of profound economic and social reforms. The inequality-decreasing effects of state transfers were robust and continued to be effective during the latter part of the 1990s, particularly in Poland and Hungary. 
Data description
In this paper, we use a newly-created data base of inequality statistics for twentysix transition economies. It has three important characteristics: (i) it is the largest data base because it includes detailed inequality data for more than 200 country/years covering the 16 year period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , (ii) it is overwhelmingly calculated from micro (household-level) survey data, and (iii) we are therefore able to go, in the empirical analysis, beyond the use of the synthetic inequality statistics (such as the Gini coefficient) and to use decile shares. The advantage of the last point is that it allows us to have many more observations, and more importantly, presents a much more nuanced (and accurate) picture of distribution than a single number, be it a Gini, Theil or any other synthetic inequality indicator, can. the share of the sixth from 9.6 to 9.3 etc. This is consistent with other evidence which shows that the biggest difference (in cross-country studies) between the relatively unequal and relatively equal countries resides in their top and bottom decile shares whereas the middle classes' income shares are relatively stable (Milanovic, 2008; Palma, 2006) . One can then expect that a temporal change in inequality as here would involve most important swings for the two extreme deciles. The total number of observations we have is 209. At the beginning of the period (1990 and 1991), we have observations for only 6 and 7 countries respectively, and at the very end of the period (2005) for 9 countries. 3 In between, for all other years, the number of countries included ranges from 15 to 21. This is because annual data for each of the 26 countries are not available whether because the surveys were not conducted, or because (less frequently) we did not have access to the data. The list of countries with their number of observations, and the mean top and bottom decile shares is given in Annex 1.
We therefore have an unbalanced panel where the number of observations ranges from 16 (i.e., available for all years) for Poland to only 2 (for Bosnia, Croatia, and Montenegro).
The average number of observations per country is about eight (209 divided by 26 countries).
Among our explanatory variables, the one that we are most interested in is a set of policy variables as defined and numerically estimated by EBRD. We shall use these variables both as an indicator of the average intensity of reforms (taking an unweighted average of all nine EBRD reform indexes), and as each reform separately.
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Other right-hand side variables are pretty straightforward. They include annual real growth rate, government expenditures as percentage of GDP, and annual inflation rate as measured by the change in the consumer price index (all three obtained from World Development Indicators). It may be worth briefly mentioning their evolution in time since all three are reflective of the transition process.
The growth rates are available annually for 24 countries. 5 The average unweighted rate at the onset of transition, in 1991 and 1992, was minus 13 and minus 19 percent. 6 Beginning with 1995, the average unweighted growth rate turned positive, almost monotonically increasing from about 1 percent in 1995 to more than 6 percent at the end of the period. This is a remarkable turnaround although the depth of the early depression means that eleven countries' GDPs per capita are still below their 1990 levels. 7 The population-weighted area's average GDP per capita is now only 2 percent above its 1990 level, and total real GDP of the area is exactly the same as sixteen years ago.
However, illustrating the recent turnaround, we note, for example, that since 2000, there have been only five observations of negative (and mildly so) growth rates while there were 18 observations of growth rates in excess of 10 percent per annum. At the beginning of the period, the situation was, of course, exactly the reverse: in the years 1991 and 1992, there were no fewer than 30 observations of double-digit negative growth. 4 The reform areas are the followings: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure. The EBRD indices come from the EBRD Transition Report, reflecting progress in all of these areas. Each of these individual EBRD indices is reported on a 1 to 4+ scale with higher numbers indicating greater reform progress. 5 We do not have data for Bosnia and Montenegro. 6 The average unweighted means that each country/year counts as one observation. The situation is just slightly different with government expenditures as a share of GDP. Government spending was inelastic, both when incomes severely dropped at the onset of the transition and when they kept on increasing later. Thus, the unweighted government spending as a share of GDP reached its peak of 42 percent in 1992, and more of less continuously dropped to under 30 percent by the end of the period.
The broad contours of the changes in our key variables during the transition are remarkably clear. Of course, this holds for the sample as a whole; the evolution for each individual country is bound to show peculiarities of its own. On average, inequality grew between 1990 and 1995 and stayed stable since; growth was negative over the same period, and after 1995 increased steadily year after year; inflation peaked in 1992 and 1993 and has since steadily gone down, and government expenditures as a share of GDP peaked around the point where average output was at its bottom (1993 and 1994) Belarus's 1.8 and Uzbekistan's 2.1. Thus, reform-wise, they seem to be almost where many of the advanced countries were after one to two years of the transition. For both East European and particularly for CIS countries, the intensity of reforms was greater up to the mid-1990s (as shown by the steepness of the line in Figure 3 and a flexion point around 1995) than afterwards. This is as expected since reform index is bounded from above (as are, in a more substantive sense, reforms too). 
What explains change in inequality?
Explaining the increase of inequality during the transition has to rely on very little theory. The reason is to some extent obvious, namely that the transition from Communism to capitalism took place quickly and unexpectedly, so no a priori theory was developed. After the beginning of transition, and faced with the often dramatic increases in inequality, several papers tried to formalize the factors and mechanism associated with the increase. They were reviewed in Section 1. Milanovic (1999) saw increased inequality arising from the transfer of labor force from an egalitarian public sector to a much more in inegalitarian private sector. In his view, the structural, or rather, ownership, transformation was the primary force behind increased inequality. Similarly, Ivaschenko (2002) linked privatization and structural change expressed as "deindustrializaton" to increased inequality. But, as discussed in the review of the existing literature, other factors were, in a heuristic fashion, also linked with changes in inequality. Noticing smaller increases in Central Europeans countries whose welfare systems "survived" the first wave of transition much better than those of the former Soviet republics. Keene and Prasad (2002) argued that maintaining social expenditures provided a strong cushion against runaway inequality. In an early article on the political economy of reforms, Hellman (1988) linked high levels of inequality to non-completed reforms. In his simple cross-section, both the more advanced reformers in Central Europe and non-reformers in Central Asia had lower levels of inequality than reformers that stopped "halfway" like Russia and Ukraine. Hellman ascribed these developments to the entrenched role of the new oligarchic elites.
Following on some of these insights, we estimate country fixed-effect model where inequality is associated with growth rate of the economy (measured by the annual GDI increase), inflation rate (measured by the annual increase in the consumer price index), intensity of structural reforms (measured to be the unweighted average value of nine EBRD reform indices), government spending as a share of GDI, and level of country's democracy (as measured by the Polity database). In addition, we control for the type of survey instrument used (income or expenditures), and the survey reference period (whether monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual). From the existing literature, both transition-, and non-transition-based, we can derive expectations regarding the role of some of the explanatory variables. For example, inflation is generally found to be positively associated with inequality (Bulir, 2001) . Social expenditures, as already mentioned, are expected to dampen the rise in inequality. Democracy is also generally found to be anti-inequality although the evidence is not very robust (e.g., Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Li, Squire and Zou 1998 ; but see also Rodrik, 1999) . But for a couple of variables we do not have strong priors based on theory or existing empirical evidence.
For example, different types of reforms may be thought to affect inequality differently.
While there is little disagreement that privatization is likely to increase inequality (see in particular Ivaschenko, 2002) , other reforms may have the opposite effect. Thus, financial liberalization, associated with financial deepening could be thought to be pro-equality, as indeed some influential papers have argued (e.g., Li, Squire and Zou, 1998) . For this reason, in addition to reforms overall whose effects are explored in this section, we shall look (in Section 4) at the effect of each individual reform. Even less a priori obvious is the effect of growth rate of the economy. It seems that its effect cannot even be postulated in advance since some growth-inducing policies may be pro-poor and others anti-poor. Therefore, whether the growth process as such has been pro-or anti-poor should emerge as result of the empirical analysis rather than be hypothesized in advance.
The regressions are run across each decile share defined as the share of i-th decile (deciles running from 1, the poorest, to 10, the richest) in total survey income (or total survey expenditures. depending of what is the survey instrument).We use the method of SURE (seemingly unrelated regressions) where each individual left-hand side variable is regressed on the same set of explanatory variables. Since the decile shares sum to 1, we impose constraints on the coefficients such that the sum of products of coefficients associated with a given variable and decile shares be equal to 0. In other words, we want to guarantee that an infinitesimal increase in an explanatory variable leaves the sum of income shares unchanged, that is equal to 1. The results are shown in Table 1 . As can be seen, there are 177 surveys which gives a total of 1770 data points (for all ten deciles). 9 Each regression is run over 177 points belonging to a given decile. The panel is unbalanced as some countries have many more observations than others. However, since we adjust for unobserved fixed country effects this should not affect the estimated values of the coefficients. The R-square runs between 0.5 and 0.6 for the bottom six deciles and the top decile. For the four uppermiddle deciles, R 2 are lower, ranging between 0.2 and 0.38. 8 In regressions, decile share are expressed as a multiple as the mean rather than as the percentages of the total. Thus, the bottom decile's share of (say) 3 percent of total income is translated as 0.3 mean incomes. This can be interpreted as the average income of the bottom decile normalized by the mean. Note: Statistically significant coefficients (at 1 and 5 percent levels) denoted by respectively two and one asterisks; z values between brackets Dincome is a binary variable taking value of 1 is survey is income based and 0 is expenditure-or consumption-based. Quarterly, semiannual, annual are binary variables for survey reference period (the omitted variable is monthly). Inflation rate is expressed in natural logs.
We shall consider results one by one. Growth rate is strongly anti-poor as the coefficients on the two bottom deciles are statistically significantly negative and likewise the coefficients on the top two deciles are significantly positive. Across the rest of income distribution, higher growth rate is neutral, that is does not affect decile shares.
The implication is that acceleration of growth has generally left the income share of the poor lower. This does not imply however that their average income had gone down since a smaller share might have been counterbalanced by a higher overall income but it still highlights a concern that advantages of growth were unbalanced and tended to accrue mostly to higher income groups. And in effect, while statistically significant, the absolute amount of the effect seems to be small. For the bottom decile, one percent acceleration in growth is associated with a decrease in its income share of 0.026 percentage points. The average income share of the bottom decile is 3.2 percentage points. Thus, to keep the absolute real income of the bottom decile from falling, the growth acceleration needs to be greater than 0.8 percent 10 which, as we have seen, is the case by assumption. For the second decile, the outcome is ever stronger, as the implicit growth rate needed to keep its absolute income from falling is only 0.13 percent. We conclude that higher growth tended to rise absolute incomes of the poorest too but did so less than in proportion to the rest (see Figure 3) . share in the sample is 3.2 percent of total income. Accordingly, in order for greater reforms to increase the absolute income of the bottom decile, the increase in total income generated by reforms must be in excess of 12.5 percent (0.4 divided by 3.2). This is, of course, an extremely high growth on a yearly basis and, in the short-term reforms are therefore very unlikely to be pro-poor in an absolute sense as far as the bottom income decile is concerned.
A somewhat surprising finding is that greater government expenditures seem to be distribution-neutral. In effect, for no decile do greater expenditures (as a share of GDI)
show either positive or negative statistically significant coefficient. The effect which is generally very strong (including here; regressions not shown in the text) when run in a cross-country setting dissipates in a model where we control for country effects. In other words, the conclusion that the difference between inequality in (say) Poland and Russia may be related to their governments' spending amounts does not seem to be warranted.
Once we control for unobserved country characteristics, we cannot argue that greater government spending in Russia (or in Poland) would result in less inequality. It seems that all of the identification of this variable's effect on inequality comes from cross-country variation. Part of the problem may lie, however, in the fact that government expenditures include all kinds of expenditures not all of which may be directed toward the poor or lower middle classes. If one could isolate social, rather than total government, expenditures (which unfortunately the data do not allow us to do), it could be that the effect would cease to be insignificant.
The effect of democracy is very interesting. Its pro-equality effect cuts very "deeply" because it raises the income shares of the bottom six deciles, is then "neutral"
for the following three deciles, and strongly anti top decile. The increase of one democracy point on the 21-point Polity scale increases the share of the bottom decile by 0.08 percentage points which seems small in absolute amounts but not so when we reflect that the average share of the bottom decile is only 3.2 percentage points. In other words, one point increase in the democracy indicator is equal to a distribution-neutral growth rate of some 2.5 percent (0.08 divided by 3.2). The effect is similar for the following two deciles (second and third). An intriguing result is that a combination of modest democratization (increase of 1 Polity point) and modest acceleration in growth (1 percent), will, on average, increase absolute incomes of the bottom deciles even if growth per se has a disequalizing effect. However, a very strong negative effect of reforms on bottom decile share cannot be so easily offset by democratization.
Finally, the effects of the survey instrument (income or expenditure) or reference period are statistically insignificant throughout.
The role of individual EBRD reform indicators
In the previous section, the intensity of structural reforms in transition countries has been measured by unweighted average of the nine EBRD transitional indicators:
However, as already mentioned, it is highly likely that these various components of the EBRD transition index could have different and even opposing effects in the evolution of inequality. For example, while large scale privatization may likely lead to an increase inequality (e.g., Ivaschenko, 2002) , deepening of financial liberalization could have the opposite effect (e.g., Li, Squire and Zou, 1998) . Hence, in this section we analyze the effect on inequality of each of the nine EBRD transitional indicators separately. Table 2 presents the coefficients from a seemingly unrelated regression equation
(SURE) of the share of deciles whereby all the nine EBRD transition indicators used explanatory variables. Before discussing the results pertinent to this section, it is worth mentioning that the other key explanatory variables stayed robust despite introducing a new set of explanatory structural reform variables. For example, both the signs and significance of growth, inflation, and democracy variables remained the same as they were in the previous regression equation (Table 1 ). As such, this section discusses the effects on inequality of the EBRD transition indicators only.
Large and small scale privatization schemes appear to have opposing effects on the evolution of inequality in the transition countries. The statistically significant and positive coefficients on the bottom five deciles suggest that progress in small scale privatization is strongly pro-poor. This observation is further strengthened by the statistically significant negative coefficients on the top three deciles. On other hand, large scale privatization tends to worsen inequality as the negative (positive) coefficients on the bottom (top) deciles imply, albeit not strongly significant.
Another EBRD transition variable that has significant bearing on the evolution of inequality is progress in reforming infrastructure, which included electric power, railways, roads, telecommunications, water, and waste water. Reforms in these infrastructure and utility sectors have worsened inequality. They appear to benefit mostly those in the top two deciles (i.e., the richest 20 percent) of the population. Nearly 70 percent of the population has seen their share of consumption or income decline as a result of infrastructure privatization and fee-changes. This outcome may be partly explained by the fact that infrastructure privatization meant the abolition of monolithic government ownership of these structures that used to provide at times inefficient, yet subsidized and/or free, services to their citizens before the transition. The sizes of the two strongly significant effects (pro-poor small scale privatization and pro-rich infrastructure reform)
are such that they almost exactly balance each other out: 1 point increase in the respective EBRD indexes produce about the same absolute effect.
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The rest of the EBRD transition indicators played more or less non-discriminatory role in the evolution of inequality. Enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive business environment appear to favor those in the middle income classes, with no significant effect on the poorest and the richest. Improvement in the banking laws and regulations, and financial deepening also benefit more those in the middle and upper income brackets. There is some indication that enterprise restructuring tends to favor the very top income class to the detriment of the middle. If job losses, following upon restruturing, are concentrated among middle classes, this is not surprising.
The rest of the EBRD components are inequality-neutral. But in some cases, that neutrality is quite remarkable: thus price liberalization, and foreign trade and exchange rate liberalization, frequently regarded as anti-poor, at least in the short term, appear to have an entirely neutral effect on income distribution. Note: Statistically significant coefficients (at 1 and 5 percent levels) denoted by respectively two and one asterisks; z values between brackets. Dincome is a binary variable taking value of 1 is survey is income based and 0 is expenditure-or consumption-based. Quarterly, semiannual, annual are binary variables for survey reference period (the omitted variable is monthly). Inflation rate;; is expressed in natural logs.
Conclusions
Using for the first time micro data from household surveys in an unbalanced panel framework covering 26 transition economies over fifteen year period, the paper has investigated the correlates of inequality increase in post-Communist countries. Another feature the paper has been the use, not of a single inequality index like a Gini coefficient, but decile shares which give a much more detailed picture of changes in distribution.
While, for example, the Gini coefficient can remain unchanged with increases in income shares among both the rich and the poor (and a corresponding decline in the middle); but the share-based analysis captures these changes well. Using the method of seeminglyunrelated regressions, run for each decile, and fixed (country effect) specification, we find that reforms, as measured by the average EBRD index for a given country/year, have had a robust negative effect on income shares of the bottom four deciles, and positive on income shares of the top two deciles. The intuitive feeling that reforms in postcommunist countries were anti-poor (at least in the distributional sense) is confirmed.
Breaking down the reform index into its nine EBRD-defined types of reforms, we find that the negative effect on income shares of the bottom is due mostly to infrastructural reforms which include introduction (and increases) of fees for services, and privatization of electricity, railways, roads, water provision etc. On the other hand, small scale privatization has the opposite (pro-poor) effect. Among the other relevant variables, the most important and significant is the role of democracy which raises the incomes shares of the bottom deciles. Not surprisingly, we find inflation to be anti-poor; highly significant for the income shares of both the bottom and the top. Growth as such has, on the other hand, been disequalizing. However, this (relative) effect has been sufficiently small so that growth per se has been associated with an increase in real income of the bottom deciles (including the lowest). In other words, growth was anti-poor in relative, but not in the absolute, sense. Finally, once we control for country-effects, we find absence of association between government expenditures as a share of GDI and inequality. Thus, the oft-quoted relationship between government spending and inequality in (say) Poland vs. Russia (with spending being high in Poland and hence, it is argued, inequality low) gets its entire identification from cross-country level regressions.
What policy implications emerge from this work? First, it is important to look at the reform process in a more nuanced and discriminating way. This in particular refers to the negative role played by infrastructural reform that might have been often pushed onto the population too fast and too hard (including by the international financial organizations). The result also shows that the attempts to cushion low income groups from the effects of such reforms have been unsuccessful. As far as the World Bank is concerned, the results point to a need to review both the tenor of infrastructure reform advocated so far and the policies that have been employed to help the poor from their negative short-term impact. Second, it confirms the importance of small-scale privatization in keeping inequality in check-probably by providing much needed jobs.
Third, it shows a crucial role played by democratization and control of inflation. Fourth, it leads us to be much more skeptical in using government spending as a means to redistribute resources toward the poorer strata. Fifth, it shows that growth is crucial for real incomes of all including the poor, even if it tends to be (in relative terms)
disequalizing. Sixth, it shows that price and trade liberalization, often regarded as detrimental to the poor, were not so in the context of post-Communist transition: the effect of both is entirely distribution-neutral.
As we have seen, inequality in post-Communist countries has broadly charted a course characterized by large increases up to around 1995, and stability afterwards. These large increases, the results show, have been driven by macro instability (high inflation) and fast reform. In the second period, after 1995, both of these elements subsided and inequality stayed approximately at the level it reached around the mid-1990s. 
